Quarterly Human Rights Report 2024 by the Coalition of Somali Human Rights Defenders CSHRD
Contents
– Introduction
– Executive Summary
– Press Freedom & Freedom of Expression
– The Civic Space Situation
– The War on Al-Shabab
– Civilians under Attack
– Displacements & Humanitarian Assistance
– Sexual & Gender Based Violence GBV
– Violation against Children´s Rights
– Somaliland
– Recommendations
– Conclusion
The Coalition of Somali Human Rights Defenders (CSHRD)
Somalia Human Rights Situation Quarterly Report 1, May 30, 2024
Introduction
The Coalition of Somali Human Rights Defenders (CSHRD) is committed to monitoring, documenting, and advocating for the protection of human rights across Somalia. This quarterly report for 2024 aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the current human rights situation, highlight key issues, and propose actionable recommendations for stakeholders.
Methodology
To ensure the accuracy and reliability of our findings, CSHRD employed a multi-faceted methodology:
- Data Collection: Information was gathered through field visits, interviews with victims and witnesses, and collaboration with local human rights organizations. Additionally, secondary data from credible sources such as governmental reports, international organizations, and media outlets were analyzed.
- Verification: Collected data underwent rigorous verification processes. Cross-checking with multiple sources was conducted to confirm the authenticity of reported incidents.
- Analysis: The verified data were analyzed to identify patterns, trends, and key areas of concern. Statistical tools and qualitative methods were utilized to interpret the findings comprehensively.
- Reporting: The final report was compiled to present a balanced and accurate representation of the human rights situation. Case studies and testimonials are included to provide personal perspectives on the issues.
Executive Summary
The first quarter of 2024 has been marked by significant human rights challenges in Somalia. Key findings include:
- Conflict-Related Violations: Ongoing conflicts between armed groups and government forces have resulted in numerous civilian casualties, displacement, and destruction of property. There have been reports of indiscriminate attacks, extrajudicial killings, and forced recruitment of children by armed groups.
- Freedom of Expression: Journalists and human rights defenders continue to face harassment, intimidation, and violence. Several instances of arbitrary arrests and detentions have been documented, hindering the freedom of the press and expression.
- Gender-Based Violence: Incidents of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) remain alarmingly high. Women and girls are particularly vulnerable, with many cases going unreported due to fear of stigma and lack of access to justice.
- Displacement and Humanitarian Crisis: The ongoing conflict and natural disasters, such as droughts, have exacerbated the displacement crisis. Internally displaced persons (IDPs) face severe living conditions, limited access to basic services, and heightened protection risks.
- Access to Justice: The judicial system continues to struggle with capacity and integrity issues. Many victims of human rights abuses are unable to seek justice due to corruption, lack of resources, and insecurity.
Press Freedom & Freedom of Expression
On January 6, 2024, Somaliland police conducted a raid on the MM Somali TV studio, a privately-owned station, in Hargeisa, Somaliland, during a discussion on the Somaliland-Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The police violently detained MM Somali TV founder Mohamed Abdi Ilig, reporter Mohamed Abdi Abdullahi (known as Andar), and cameraman Ilyaas Abdinasir. Although reporter Mohamed Abdi Abdullahi (Andar) and cameraman Ilyaas Abdinasir were released on the afternoon of January 9 without charges, the station’s founder Mohamed Abdi Ilig remains in detention without any charges brought against him. MM Somali TV founder Mohamed Abdi Ilig gained his freedom on after enduring 43 days of imprisonment, initially held in a detention facility operated by Somaliland national intelligence before being transferred to police custody.
On January 7, 2024, Armed Somali police officers executing eviction orders from the Banadir Regional Court chairman, Salah Ali Mohamud, targeted RTN TV reporter Abdihafid Nor Barre and cameraman Abdukadir Abukar Ali in Waberi district, Mogadishu. The television crew was covering the eviction incident, conducting interviews with family members residing in the affected property. The interviewed family members asserted that the eviction was unlawful and implicated senior court officials in the case. The journalists were forced to flee to safety after an armed police officer pointed a gun at them while the reporter was recording a piece-to-camera clip.
On January 20, 2024, in the midst of a human rights-focused training session for SJS women journalists, three Somali national intelligence (NISA) officers, led by Mohamed Fooxle and Hassan Dahir from the surveillance unit, unexpectedly arrived at Hotel Sahafi in Mogadishu where the training was held. Engaging in disruptive behavior, they harassed hotel staff, trainers, and participants, insisting on obtaining the list of participants, training content, and other related documents. Despite efforts by SJS and hotel management to explain the nature of the training, while emphasizing the need to protect the privacy of participants. The NISA officers ordered an abrupt halt to the day’s session, concluding it an hour earlier than scheduled.
On January 22, 2024, NISA and police officers denied access to Somali Cable TV journalists who were trying to cover the parliament’s Lower House proceedings of the day. The journalists told to media that the reason was linked to a video clip aired on Saturday, showing a Member of Parliament spraying water on parliament officials during the opening of the parliamentary session discussing constitutional affairs.
On February 15, 2024, Police in the town of Cadaado in Galmudug briefly detained Sharma’arke Mohamed, founder and journalist of the local private Radio Cadaado. His detention followed a Facebook post where he advocated for justice for two businessmen who were recently shot dead in Dhusamareb town. Sharma’arke was released a few hours after his arrest, thanks to the intervention of local authorities.
On February 18, 2024, Puntland security forces obstructed and briefly detained Freelance journalist Jamal Muhumed Osman and his female producer, who work for UK’s Channel 4 News in Garowe, Puntland State. Despite being accredited and assured of their security, Jamal and his producer arrived in Garowe to work on interviews for their documentary program on the Red Sea crisis. However, they were stopped at the Garowe Airport and subsequently held in custody in the city before being released later that evening. Their journalistic assignment was impeded when they were forcibly flown back to Ethiopia on Monday 19 February, preventing them from fulfilling their journalistic duties This marks the second instance of journalist Jamal facing restrictions in the country, with a previous incident occurring in December 2022 at the Mogadishu airport.
On March 13, 2024, Journalist Sugaal Moalim Mohamud, who is employed by the Somalia government-owned media outlets of Radio Mogadishu and SNTV was suspended, and his salary cut in retaliation for expressing views regarding the Somali government’s military operations, particularly highlighting issues of mismanagement and corruption within the Ministry of Defense. The Director General of the Ministry of Information, Abdullahi Hayir Duale, issued a letter titled ‘Decision Making on Labour Complaint,’ wherein he authorized the suspension of journalist Sugaal Moalim Mohamud, a reporter at Radio Mogadishu and Somali National TV (SNTV) from his duties for a period of one month, along with a corresponding cut in his monthly pay. Additionally, Sugaal was prohibited from accessing the Ministry of Information building for the same duration. The letter was formally communicated to the National Civil Service Commission. “Sugaal has been accused of publishing a comment against the Somali Government on his private Facebook knowing the rules and regulations of the state media,” Director Duale said in his letter. Despite the one month period ended, the journalist is still suspended and his salary stopped as of 30 April 2024.
On March 14, 2024, Prominent journalist Abdikarin Ahmed Bulhan was murdered in the town of Abudwak, in the central Somalia region of Galgaduud. Abdikarin, a correspondent for the state-owned Somali National TV (SNTV) and Somali National News Agency (SONNA), sustained two bullet injuries on March 13, 2024, according to family members and eyewitnesses. One bullet penetrated from the right side of his jaw to the left, while another struck his right leg. He later succumbed to his injuries leaving behind wife and five children. The suspected killer, Abdihakin Ahmed Egal was arrested and arraigned in the Galgaduud Regional Court on March 26 where he was sentenced with death penalty. On March 28, a firing squad executed Abdihakin Ahmed Egal in a public place in Abudwak town of Galgaduud region.
On March 14, 2024, The Office of Somali Prime Minister made unlawful announcement by unilaterally appointing nine individuals for the Somali Press Council. In the prime minister’s statement, the appointment was made through the suggestion of from the ministry of information. However, the members appointed are government officials and employees – some affiliated with the National Intelligence (NISA) and Ministry of Information, and on this regard, other media groups joined in denouncing this move and calling for an immediate withdrawal of the unconstitutional appointment. While we strongly advocate for the independence of the Somali Press Council and believe its formation should only occur through consensus among all stakeholders, and the body should serve as a regulatory council that not upholds freedom of the media.
On March 16, 2024, Colonel Yusuf Farah Sharma’arke, the Somaliland military court prosecutor approved to the attorney general to bring criminal charges against five independent lawyers in Somaliland and their licenses might be revoked as a retaliation to a recent case they filed challenging the Somaliland National Intelligence Agency (NIA). According to documents, the Director-General of the NIA, Mustafa Hassan, has asked the Office of the Attorney General of the Somaliland Armed Forces to press criminal charges against the five lawyers. The lawyers facing prosecution are Mubarik Mohamud Abdi, Mohamed Hussein Arale, Mohamud Abdirahman Nur, Mukhtar Dahir Jibril, and Hussein Shabeel Abdillahi.
On March 9, the five lawyers, who are part of the Somaliland Lawyers Association, submitted a legal recommendation indicating that the NIA and the military court do not have the power or legality to detain and investigate civilians, including journalists. The lawyers referred to the raid and arbitrary detention of MM Somali TV journalists that took place in early February in Hargeisa, among several other cases. They suggested that the intelligence agency cease detaining civilians, including journalists and others with dissenting voices.
On April 1, 2024, Somali security forces in the town of Luuq in Gedo region arrested radio Ergo journalist Mohamud Abdirashid, following a social media post that exposed the alleged injury of two local men who are tuk-tuk drivers and shot by local police over unpaid ‘fees’ demanded by the police. Mohamud freelances for the Nairobi-based humanitarian Radio Ergo, whose radio reported that the journalist was transferred to the custody of the Ethiopian forces in the region. According to colleagues interviewed by the media and voice messages we reviewed, Mohamud had been threatened with severe punishment after his post on Facebook, which he later deleted. Upon arrest on 1 April by the local police in Luuq, he was handed over to the Ethiopian forces in the town Radio Ergo also reported that the journalist was transferred to the custody of the Ethiopian forces in the region. He was freed on April 8, 2024 and was not charged.
On April 9, 2024, Somalia authorities froze the Somali Journalists Syndicate (SJS) bank accounts, in what the media organization perceived as acts of sabotage against their press freedom activities across Somalia. In an email notification from the Premier Bank indicated that SJS bank accounts were “frozen” following a letter issued by the Banadir Regional Court ordering “the freeze of SJS bank accounts” and “investigation into the financial transactions”. Then two other banks: Dahabshiil Bank International and the IBS Bank Somalia also froze SJS accounts. Despite seeking clarification, both written and oral, no response was provided. Afterwards, lawyers visited the court to seek further information, but once again, no explanation was given. The move which is still ongoing is having severe impact on SJS operations and stalled planned activities as the organization is unable to access funds in its accounts. SJS were also blocked from going to the court to seek injection up to three times after the court staff said they were not working or simply the judges were not on duty, a clear indication that the measures are more about intimidation meant to hinder the media’s vital work and civil society organizations in general.
On April 15, 2024, the Office of Somalia Attorney General published a press statement announcing three criminal charges against SJS and its leadership. The three charges – Art. 372. (False Certification by a Private Individual); Art. 378. (Use of False Document); Art. 452. (Defamation). The statement added that the attorney general’s office is conducting investigation and once it completes, the case will be submitted to the court. As of today, neither the attorney general’s office, nor the court communicated to SJS notifying such charges. In the meantime, while SJS saw the charges on the social media, the official charge sheet was not delivered to SJS office or its lawyers as required by law. SJS has been in the past targeted by the same offices and the ministry of information officials and therefore regards these new developments and the suspension of its bank accounts as intimidation tactic to hinder the vital press freedom work.
On April 16, 2024, Journalist and SYL TV founder, Hussein Abdulle Mohamed gone missing late on Tuesday, April 16, 2024, after being summoned for a meeting with the director of the Somali National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) in Mogadishu. According to the journalist and other sources, Hussein was taken from a hotel near the NISA headquarters at around 4:00 PM on Tuesday. Following a meeting that lasted only 8 minutes inside the NISA headquarters at the Habar Khadijo building in Mogadishu’s Shibis District, he was transferred to the notorious Godka Jilacow facility, where he was held overnight. He was released late on Wednesday April 17, 2024. “Thank God. I got my freedom after 24 hours of kidnapping,” Hussein wrote on his Facebook page upon his freedom. Hussein has published several reports exposing NISA, including one detailing expected sacking within the agency and another revealing an abandoned borehole on the city outskirts allegedly used by security forces to dump of the bodies of assassination victims. Some of these reports have been deleted from SYLT TV platforms and Hussein’s Facebook page.
On April 24, 2024, Somaliland police in Hargeisa detained Horn Cable TV reporter Shueyb Hassan Dheere and cameraman Mustafe Xayd working for Sky TV in Hargeisa. The pair were collecting vox-pops from local population affected by enforced eviction of residents from a public land located in the 26th June district, Hargeisa, Somaliland. The two journalists were held the day in the Daloodha police station before they were freed overnight without charges.
In the first quarter of 2024, the civic space in Somalia continues to be severely constrained, presenting numerous challenges for civil society organizations, human rights defenders, journalists, and the general public. This section outlines the major issues impacting civic space and the environment for public participation and expression.
- Freedom of Expression and Press Freedom
Freedom of expression in Somalia remains under significant threat. Journalists and media personnel face constant dangers, including harassment, intimidation, arbitrary detention, and even murder. Media outlets are pressured to self-censor due to threats from both state and non-state actors. Despite some efforts to improve media laws, the lack of effective implementation and protection mechanisms has left journalists vulnerable and restricted in their work. Regional and federal authorities continued to harass, intimidate, and detain journalists.
Abdalle Ahmed Mumin, secretary general of the Somali Journalists Syndicate (SJS), was sentenced by a court in February, four months after his arrest after he raised concerns about a government directive restricting reporting on national security issues.
Upon sentencing, the court ordered his release on the basis that he had already served his term. He was rearrested 10 days afterward and only eventually released on March 26.
In August, Mohamed Ibrahim Osman Bulbul, journalist at the privately owned broadcaster Kaab TV, was detained and charged with “bringing the State into contempt” and “circulating false and tendentious news.” His detention came a day after he reported on alleged government misuse of funds linked to European Union capacity-building trainings of police. A high court judge stated that he could not be charged under the criminal code and then eventually ordered Mohamed’s release in October. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, the SJS’s website was the victim of a cyberattack in August.
- Human Rights Defenders (HRDs)
Human rights defenders operate in a highly precarious environment. They face frequent threats, harassment, and violence from government forces, armed groups, and other powerful entities. The lack of legal protection and the pervasive culture of impunity further exacerbate the risks for HRDs, impeding their ability to advocate for human rights and hold perpetrators accountable. Havsa is an award winning indigenous climate and environmental activist whose work has prompted threats of violence against her and is in emergency situation that requires to be addressed urgently. Xoriyo is too an indigenous environmental defender who resisted development related indigenous community displacement and destruction of their environment or habitat and consequently is at risk and direly needs protection.
- Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)
Civil society organizations are crucial for advancing human rights, providing humanitarian aid, and promoting development. However, they face restrictive regulations, limited access to funding, and security threats. Government scrutiny, bureaucratic obstacles, and the volatile security situation hinder their operations, making it difficult for CSOs to function effectively and independently.
- Public Participation and Assembly
The right to peaceful assembly is frequently violated in Somalia. Protests and public gatherings are often met with excessive force by security forces, resulting in injuries and sometimes fatalities. The restrictive environment limits citizens’ ability to engage in public discourse, express dissent, and advocate for their rights, undermining democratic participation.
- Legal and Institutional Framework
The legal framework governing civic space is often used to suppress dissent and restrict the activities of civil society. Laws are selectively enforced to target critics and opposition figures, while corruption and a lack of judicial independence undermine the rule of law. Legal reforms are urgently needed to ensure that laws protect civic freedoms rather than restrict them.
Constitutional Amendments
In 2024, Somalia underwent significant constitutional amendments under the leadership of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. These changes were focused on reforming the political system and promoting democratic governance.
Key amendments included the introduction of universal suffrage, replacing the long-standing clan-based indirect voting system. This shift allows citizens to directly elect the head of state, who, under the new system, will have the authority to appoint and dismiss the prime minister. These amendments also established a framework for having three national political parties, enhancing political pluralism in Somalia.
https://www.horndiplomat.com/2024/03/30/somalia-parliament-approves-constitutional-amendments/ ).
The amendments were approved unanimously by both houses of the federal parliament and involved extensive public consultation, with over 200,000 Somali citizens reviewing and providing feedback on the new constitutional chapters
https://hiiraan.com/news4/2024/Apr/195691/somali_president_signs_constitution_amendments_despite_puntland_withdraws_recognition.aspx
Somalia’s international Partners welcome Constitutional amendments
Despite this broad parliamentary support, the regional state of Puntland rejected the amendments, withdrawing its recognition of the federal government. Puntland’s leadership argued that the amendments violated prior federal agreements and called for a mutually agreed constitutional process involving a public referendum.
https://hiiraan.com/news4/2024/Apr/195691/somali_president_signs_constitution_amendments_despite_puntland_withdraws_recognition.aspx
https://www.jurist.org/news/2024/04/somalia-state-of-puntland-rejects-constitutional-amendments-and-withdraws-from-federal-government/
The international community, including Somalia’s international partners, welcomed the amendments, viewing them as a commitment to democratic principles and human rights. These reforms are seen as vital steps toward stabilizing the country and ensuring a more inclusive political process.
Somalia’s international Partners welcome Constitutional amendments
The War on Al-Shabab
In 2024, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud has intensified the war against Al-Shabaab with significant military campaigns and strategic initiatives. This renewed offensive, which began in 2022, aims to dismantle the terrorist group’s stronghold in Somalia. One of the key strategies employed by President Mohamud involves leveraging local clan militias to combat Al-Shabaab, providing them with support to resist and expel the militants from their territories
https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/al-shabab-somalia
The campaign has seen some success, particularly in central regions like Hirshabelle and Galmudug, where government forces and clan militias have managed to reclaim several villages and reduce Al-Shabaab’s influence. For instance, in recent operations, the Somali National Army, supported by armed locals, has reportedly killed numerous Al-Shabaab fighters and liberated multiple areas.
https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-president-sees-progress-in-fight-against-al-shabab-seeks-more-us-support/6751756.html
President Mohamud to Reinforce War Efforts Against Al-Shabaab from Dhusamareb
However, the involvement of clan militias introduces significant risks. While these local forces are crucial in the fight against Al-Shabaab, there are concerns about the long-term stability and unity of Somalia. Arming specific clan militias could exacerbate existing clan rivalries and potentially lead to future conflicts once Al-Shabaab is weakened. This fragmentation risk underscores the delicate balance the government must maintain in its efforts to eradicate the militant group
https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/al-shabab-somalia
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-february-1-2024.
Additionally, the geopolitical dynamics involving neighboring countries like Ethiopia also complicate the situation. Recent diplomatic tensions, such as those surrounding a controversial port deal, have strained Somali-Ethiopian relations, further impacting the coordination and effectiveness of joint counterterrorism efforts.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-february-1-2024
Overall, while President Mohamud’s aggressive stance against Al-Shabaab has brought some tactical victories, the broader implications of these strategies, particularly the arming of clan militias, present a complex challenge for Somalia’s long-term peace and stability
https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/al-shabab-somalia
https://www.voanews.com/a/somalia-president-sees-progress-in-fight-against-al-shabab-seeks-more-us-support/6751756.html
President Mohamud to Reinforce War Efforts Against Al-Shabaab from Dhusamareb
Civilians under Attack
An uptick in fighting in several parts of the country resulted in hundreds of civilian casualties and forced almost 650,000 people to flee. While famine conditions were averted, five consecutive below-average annual rains continued to have a devastating impact on the realization of the rights to food and health, with at least 4.3 million people in urgent need of food assistance.
Fighting broke out in the contested town of Las Anod, on the Somaliland-Puntland border, between Somaliland security forces and armed groups linked to the Dhulbahante clan, leaving dozens of civilians dead and forcing over 154,000 people to flee internally or, for many, to Ethiopia.
The armed group Al-Shabab conducted targeted and indiscriminate attacks that killed hundreds of civilians. The offensive against Al-Shabab launched by President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in 2022 in central Somalia, in which government forces supported clan militia, led to civilian displacement. In March, the president announced a new offensive in southern Somalia.
In June, the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) withdrew 2,000 of an estimated 20,000 forces from Somalia as part of its expected withdrawal by late 2024. The Somali government requested in September a delay in the withdrawal of an additional 3,000 troops.
The government has not reformed Somalia’s outdated penal code. It approved a law granting the abusive national intelligence agency broader powers of detention and surveillance. Authorities throughout Somalia harassed and arbitrarily arrested journalists.
Somalia criminalizes consensual same-sex conduct with up to three years in prison.
Attacks on Civilians
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), an increase in fighting in several parts of the country resulted in greater conflict-related deaths and injuries.
Al-Shabab’s targeted and indiscriminate attacks—using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), suicide bombings, shelling, and targeted killings—resulted in a high number of civilian casualties. The armed group conducted attacks in areas that the government had taken control of as part of its operations in central Somalia.
In June, there were clashes between security forces and armed opposition groups in Puntland’s capital, Garowe, following a debate in parliament over changes to the voting system, with opposition members accusing the regional president of seeking to extend his term. Media reported that at least 26 people were killed.
Displacements & Humanitarian Assistance
Since late 2023 and up to now, 1.5 million people were newly internally displaced, 40 percent of whom were displaced due to conflict, the United Nations reported.
The Somali government did not hand over Al-Shabab cases from military to civilian courts. Authorities throughout the country carried out executions, many following military court proceedings that violated international fair trial standards.
Al-Shabab fighters continued to execute individuals accused of working or spying for the government and foreign forces, often after unfair trials.
In March, the president signed into law a National Security and Intelligence Agency (NISA) bill that granted sweeping powers of arrest, detention, and surveillance with minimal independent oversight to the abusive agency.
Displacement and Access to Humanitarian Assistance
The humanitarian situation remained dire. After Somalia faced five consecutive below-average rains, the Gu rains from March to June were better than forecasted, helping to reduce some of the immense constraints, including food price hikes. However, the rains also resulted in flash floods, forcing tens of thousands to flee in parts of the country.
The UN predicted that between October and December 2023, nearly 4.3 million people are expected to be acutely food insecure; between August 2023 and July 2024, 1.5 million children are expected to be acutely malnourished. Somalia is heavily dependent on food imports.
Al-Shabab continued to besiege government-controlled towns. For 10 days in July, Al-Shabab blocked routes into Baidoa town.
Humanitarian agencies faced serious access challenges due to conflict, targeted attacks on aid workers, generalized violence, restrictions imposed by parties to the conflict, including arbitrary taxation and bureaucratic hurdles, and physical constraints due to extreme weather.
In July, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders, MSF) announced they were withdrawing from Las Anod due to increased levels of violence, recurrent attacks on medical facilities, and injuries among medical staff.
People across Somalia continue to face high levels of trauma due to prolonged violence and humanitarian crises. However, the availability of mental health services in the country remains limited.
Sexual & Gender Based Violence GBV
The UN continued to report incidents of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, including against girls. The UN recorded an increase in gender-based violence from 2022 onward, documenting particularly high rates, notably domestic violence and rape, among displaced women and girls.
At time of writing, the sexual offenses bill of 2018, a progressive sexual violence legislation that stalled following backlash, citing religious objections, has not been presented before parliament. The Somali criminal code classifies sexual violence as an “offense against modesty and sexual honor” rather than a violation of bodily integrity.
Violation against Children´s Rights
Grave abuses against children continued to be documented by the UN, including killing and maiming, recruitment and use, and sexual violence. Schools continued to be attacked.
Children continued to be detained on allegations of Al-Shabab affiliation. The independent expert on the human rights situation in Somalia reported that Somali security forces, including members of NISA, increased their arrests and detentions of children in areas recently taken over by the Somali government from Al-Shabab. The independent expert raised concerns about the sentencing to death of six young men by the military court in Puntland, some of whom were children at the time of the commission of the alleged crime.
In July, the federal government adopted age verification guidelines that the UN said are intended to reduce the recruitment of children into armed forces and the detention and trial of children in adult procedures.
A bill to domesticate the Convention on the Rights of the Child was pending before parliament at time of writing.
The UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimates that 45 percent of girls are married before age 18. An estimate for boys was not provided.
Somaliland
In 2024, the political landscape in the Somaliland region has been notably unstable, particularly following an illegal Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Ethiopia. This agreement, which allows Ethiopia to develop a naval base in Somaliland, has been deemed illegal by Somalia, as it violates Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Somaliland’s administration has pushed for this MoU to gain international recognition and economic benefits, positioning itself as an independent entity despite the lack of broad international acknowledgment.
https://hiiraan.com/op4/2024/jan/194621/assessing_what_ethiopia_gives_the_courage_to_sign_an_illegal_mou_with_somaliland.aspx
Unveiling the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU: Hopes and Uncertainties
https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/analyses/ethiopian-somali-red-sea-agreement-context-geopolitical-rivalry-horn-africa ).
The geopolitical implications of this MoU are significant. For Ethiopia, the agreement provides critical sea access, potentially reducing its dependence on Djibouti for maritime trade. However, this move has intensified regional tensions, as Somalia perceives it as a direct threat to its sovereignty and regional stability. Ethiopia’s involvement in Somaliland is also seen as part of a broader strategy to bolster its geopolitical influence in the Horn of Africa, potentially aligning with UAE interests in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
https://www.dw.com/en/somaliland-eyes-ethiopias-recognition-amid-somalia-tensions/a-69015111
https://hiiraan.com/news4/2024/Feb/194980/somalia_denounces_illegal_ethiopia_somaliland_mou_as_threat_to_regional_stability_calls_for_international_condemnation.aspx
This political maneuvering has had adverse effects on independent media outlets in Somalia. Increased tensions and the Somali government’s efforts to counter the perceived encroachment have led to a more restrictive environment for journalists and media organizations. Reports indicate that media outlets face heightened scrutiny and pressure from the government as it seeks to control the narrative and maintain national unity against external and internal threats. The instability in Somaliland, combined with the contentious MoU, exacerbates the risks for journalists operating in these volatile conditions
https://hiiraan.com/op4/2024/jan/194621/assessing_what_ethiopia_gives_the_courage_to_sign_an_illegal_mou_with_somaliland.aspx
https://hiiraan.com/news4/2024/Feb/194980/somalia_denounces_illegal_ethiopia_somaliland_mou_as_threat_to_regional_stability_calls_for_international_condemnation.aspx
Overall, the illegal MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland underscores the fragility of regional politics in the Horn of Africa and highlights the ongoing struggle for recognition and sovereignty in Somaliland. It also illustrates the complex interplay of local and international interests that continue to shape the region’s political dynamics.
The Human Rights and Protection Group of the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) documented 552 civilian casualties, including 87 deaths, between late December and June due to the fighting in the town. Amnesty International reported that the fighting had killed at least 100 people and injured over 600, dozens of them civilians, including women, children, and health workers. The ICRC treated 1,700 people with conflict-related injuries.
Amnesty International found that the Somaliland forces had indiscriminately shelled the town, damaging hospitals, schools, and mosques. The UN reported that as of April, the fighting had displaced between 154,000 and 203,000 people, the majority women and children, with most fleeing into Ethiopia’s Somali region. Fighting continued at time of writing.
The authorities in Somaliland continued to restrict freedom of expression and media. On May 15, Somaliland police arrested journalist Bushaaro Ali Mohamed near the border with Ethiopia. On August 15, Bushaaro was sentenced to one year in prison, accused of tarnishing the image of state institutions.
Key International Actors
Funding for humanitarian assistance improved in late 2022 but was still underfunded, with the humanitarian response plan only 36 percent funded at time of writing. In April, during a visit to Somalia, the UN secretary-general called on donors to step up their support for the plan.
In September, the EU temporarily halted funding for the UN World Food Progamme, after a UN internal investigation reportedly found evidence of widespread theft and diversion of assistance by landowners, local authorities, and security forces. In March, the EU approved an additional €110 million to support Somalia’s armed forces and ATMIS in Somalia.
The United States acknowledged conducting at least 13 airstrikes in support of the Somali national army’s operations against Al-Shabab, primarily in central Somalia. In September, the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) stated that it had helped with the medical evacuation of civilians injured in a Somali government operation in El Lahelay.
The political instability in the Somaliland region, particularly in Awdal, has escalated due to Somaliland’s recent Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Ethiopia. This agreement, which allows Ethiopia to establish a naval base, has met with significant backlash from both local and broader Somali communities, who view it as an infringement on Somali sovereignty and national interests.
https://hiiraan.com/news4/2024/Jan/194588/somaliland_s_unraveling_hastened_by_ethiopia_port_lease_deal.aspx
In Awdal, the Gadabuursi clan leaders have openly rejected the foundational peace agreements that have long kept inter-clan tensions in check. These leaders have called for the formation of armed militias to defend against any perceived Ethiopian invasion, further straining relations with the Somaliland government.
https://thesomalidigest.com/analysis-the-prospect-of-conflict-in-the-awdal-region/)
This unrest in Awdal has manifested in widespread protests, such as those in Borama, where demonstrators vocally opposed the deal with chants of “Our sea is not for sale”
Borame Erupts in Protest Against Ethiopia-Somaliland Maritime Deal
The potential for conflict in Awdal is exacerbated by the historical grievances and unresolved inter-clan tensions, which the recent agreement has reignited. The Gadabuursi leaders’ rejection of past peace accords hints at a willingness to resort to violence to achieve their goals of greater autonomy or alignment with Somalia.
This situation not only threatens regional stability but also poses severe risks to civilians, who could be caught in the crossfire if hostilities escalate.
Moreover, the involvement of external actors, like Ethiopia, and the mobilization of militias increase the complexity and danger of the situation. The local political and security environment could deteriorate significantly, leading to humanitarian crises and displacement similar to those seen in other contested regions like Las Anod.
https://hiiraan.com/news4/2024/Jan/194588/somaliland_s_unraveling_hastened_by_ethiopia_port_lease_deal.aspx
https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/a-port-deal-puts-the-horn-of-africa-on-the-brink/ ).
In summary, the brewing conflict in Awdal, driven by rejection of the Ethiopian deal and the formation of new militias, poses a significant threat to regional stability and civilian safety in Somaliland.
The involvement of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in the 2024 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Somaliland and Ethiopia has significant geopolitical implications for the region, particularly in relation to terrorism and piracy.
The MOU, which allows Ethiopia access to Somaliland’s Red Sea coast and the port of Berbera, has been a contentious issue. This agreement is part of Ethiopia’s strategic plan to gain maritime access, a critical need for the landlocked nation. For Somaliland, the MOU represents a step toward international recognition, a long-sought goal since declaring independence from Somalia in 1991. However, this move has drawn ire from Somalia, which considers Somaliland part of its territory.
https://www.dur.ac.uk/research/current/thought-leadership/2024/02/somaliland-ethiopia-port-deal-international-opposition-flags-complex-red-sea-politics/
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia-somaliland/stakes-ethiopia-somaliland-deal.
The UAE’s involvement is multifaceted. Economically, the UAE has been investing heavily in Somaliland, particularly through DP World’s management and development of the Berbera port. This development is part of a broader UAE strategy to exert influence across the Horn of Africa and secure critical maritime routes around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Although the UAE has reduced its direct military presence in the region, it continues to project power through economic investments and strategic partnerships.
https://somalilandmonitor.com/what-uaes-growing-presence-in-somaliland-means-for-its-horn-of-africa-strategy/ )
Unveiling the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU: Hopes and Uncertainties
This strategic involvement also ties into regional security dynamics. The UAE’s investments can indirectly affect terrorism and piracy in the region. By bolstering Somaliland’s infrastructure and economic capacity, the UAE aims to stabilize the area, which could reduce the appeal of piracy and terrorism as economic alternatives. However, this presence can also exacerbate local tensions, particularly if it leads to increased militarization or rivalry with other regional powers like Turkey and Qatar, both of whom have their interests in the Horn of Africa.
What UAE’s Growing Presence in Somaliland Means for Its Horn of Africa Strategy
Furthermore, the geopolitical competition involving the UAE, along with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar, adds another layer of complexity. These powers are vying for influence in the Red Sea region, often through proxy engagements and economic investments, which can destabilize local politics and exacerbate existing conflicts. For instance, the UAE’s relationship with Somaliland could strain its ties with Somalia and other neighboring countries, potentially leading to increased instability.
Unveiling the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU: Hopes and Uncertainties
The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland has significant implications for the Horn of Africa, potentially sparking widespread conflict involving multiple regional powers such as Turkey, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and the UAE. This MoU, signed on January 1, 2024, has already led to heightened tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia, as Somalia views this agreement as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Trade, Conflict and Fragmentation: The Horn’s Crisis of Sovereignty
https://addisstandard.com/op-ed-unveiling-ethiopia-somaliland-mou-and-its-implications/ ).
The UAE’s involvement in the region, particularly through its alliances with Ethiopia and Somaliland, is a critical factor. The UAE has strategic interests in maintaining influence over key maritime routes and ports in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, aligning with Ethiopia to counterbalance the influence of other regional actors like Saudi Arabia and Qatar.
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/salafi-jihadi-movement-update-special-edition-ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal-alters-horn
Peeling back the intricacies of the Ethiopia-Somaliland intrigue
This alignment is particularly significant given the UAE’s investments in Somaliland’s ports, which are crucial for Ethiopia’s access to the sea.
Furthermore, the potential recognition of Somaliland by Ethiopia under this MoU could lead to a broader regional conflict. Countries like Egypt, which has strategic interests in the Nile River and concerns over Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), might become involved to support Somalia’s stance. Additionally, Eritrea, which shares a contentious border with Ethiopia, could view Ethiopian access to the Red Sea as a direct threat, potentially escalating military tensions
Unveiling the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU: Hopes and Uncertainties
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/salafi-jihadi-movement-update-special-edition-ethiopia-somaliland-port-deal-alters-horn
The MoU’s geopolitical ramifications extend to other regional actors as well. For instance, Turkey’s military presence in Somalia and its vested interests in the Horn of Africa complicate the situation further. Turkey’s support for Somalia could lead to a larger confrontation involving Turkish and Emirati interests
Peeling back the intricacies of the Ethiopia-Somaliland intrigue
Recommendations
To address these critical issues, CSHRD recommends the following actions:
1. Enhanced Protection for Civilians: Immediate measures should be taken to protect civilians in conflict zones, including adherence to international humanitarian law by all parties involved.
2. Support for Journalists and HRDs: Implementing protective mechanisms and legal reforms to safeguard the rights of journalists and human rights defenders.
3. Addressing Sexual & Gender-Based Violence: Strengthening legal frameworks, increasing support services for survivors, and promoting awareness campaigns to combat SGBV.
4. Humanitarian Assistance: Increasing humanitarian aid and ensuring safe and sustained access to affected populations, particularly in IDP camps.
5. Judicial Reforms: Investing in the capacity-building of judicial institutions and promoting anti-corruption measures to ensure access to fair and impartial justice.
Conclusion
The first quarter of 2024 has highlighted persistent and emerging human rights challenges in Somalia. Despite efforts by local and international stakeholders, the situation remains dire for many individuals and communities. The findings of this report underscore the urgent need for comprehensive and coordinated action to address the root causes of human rights abuses and to foster a more just and secure environment for all Somalis.
Key areas requiring immediate attention include the protection of civilians in conflict zones, the safeguarding of freedom of expression, and the prevention and response to gender-based violence. The ongoing humanitarian crisis necessitates robust and sustained support to ensure the well-being and dignity of internally displaced persons and other vulnerable groups.
Furthermore, strengthening the judicial system is essential to uphold the rule of law and provide justice to victims of human rights violations. Addressing corruption and enhancing the capacity of judicial institutions will be critical steps in this direction.
CSHRD remains committed to its mission of defending human rights and advocating for those whose voices are often marginalized. We call upon the Somali government, civil society, international partners, and all relevant stakeholders to take concerted action based on the recommendations provided in this report. By working together, we can make significant strides toward a future where human rights are respected, protected, and fulfilled for every individual in Somalia.
The CSHRD will continue to monitor the situation closely, document violations, and support initiatives aimed at promoting human rights and justice. We urge all parties to prioritize human rights and to commit to building a peaceful and equitable society.